O artigo aborda uma seleção parcial de muitos direitos reivindicados pelos cidadãos em democracias contemporâneas a respeito do sistema jurídico, segurança cidadã, gênero, jovens e acesso à informação -e apresenta o argumento de que "direitos" democráticos não são uma realidade homogênea como apresentada pela teoria liberal, mas um conceito complexo e multifacetado. Nas novas democracias de "baixa qualidade", a volatilidade de direitos apresenta-se como um desafio especial à universalidade. Um mapeamento social da variação e distribuição dos direitos negociáveis são passíveis de desvelar a realidade que cai na retórica do universalismo. Em sociedades altamente fragmentadas e desiguais, a retórica da universalidade é improvável de ser traduzida facilmente em aplicação da equidade verossímil. E a variabilidade que acompanha pode produzir instabilidade ou volatilidade por todo o tempo. Essa combinação em sociedades onde os "deveres"correspondem a direitos não são solidamente internalizados e é responsável por produzir modelos de comportamento político que desviam substancialmente da intersubjetividade do interesse postulado pelo liberalismo clássico. Ciclos políticos "contenciosos" de resistência e exclusão, e lutas para reformular as regras do jogo (em lugar de simplesmente viver nelas) parecem ser correlações naturais desse clima de incerteza. Isso é particularmente verdade em novas democracias, onde súbitas explosões de clamores de direitos e multiplicidade destes podem facilmente gerar uma atmosfera de inflação de direitos aumentando as expectativas além do que é provavelmente alcançável.
Comparing Rights Enforcement and Democratic States
Every modern democratic state operates in a multiplicity of policy domains, and interacts with the citizenry through a wide diversity of agencies and institutions. This means that the ideal of "equality of rights" has to be interpreted, filtered, and transmitted through a huge array of channels, most of which are primarily focussed on much more specialist tasks, and are in direct contact with only small subsections of the total electorate. Thus, the police must uphold the ideal of an equality of right, while mainly concentrating on the control of crime and the maintenance of public order (not usually threatened by the median voter); the courts must dispense justice (for which purpose on underpinning of democratic theory -or at least assumptions -is highly desirable if not essential). But the great bulk of the population never even enters a courthouse. The schools may provide civic education to the young, but their main objective is usually to train a workforce rather than build a republican consciousness. The same applies, for instance, to the tax administration and the consumer protection agency. Only the electoral registration agency is charged with directly promoting and protecting the democratic rights of all citizens, and is expected to achieve universal coverage in the fulfilment of that task. Other instruments of democratic socialization operate in a restricted front and perhaps only at a local level (such as safe drinking water and street lighting for all).
Similarly, from the perspective of the citizenry democratic rights are complex, diverse, fragmented, and perhaps even incommensurable.
I have a right to the vote (provided I meet the specified age, nationality, residence and criminal and mental status criteria, which can vary widely from democracy to democracy -an automatic right in Costa Rica, one requiring registration and perhaps even a driver's license in the U.S.A., to give just two examples). In Britain, I have a right to freedom of REVISTA DEBATES, Porto Alegre, v. 2, n.1, p. 33-50, jan.-jun.2008.information (but subject to the Official Secrets Act, plus whether other bureaucratic or market-derived barriers may limit the practical application of that ideal). I also have a right to privacy (except that if a democradura wishes to practice surveillance, perhaps to protect our freedoms from terrorist assault, then this right can be extensively curtailed). Even my right to life can be qualified (if the Metropolitan Police happen to mistake my trousers for a suicide belt, for instance).
Certainly my right to education, to healthcare, even to habeas corpus, can be qualified and hedged.
Since all of these rights are to some extent subject to qualification or temporary suspension, I can only hope to enjoy the full panoply of my rights by monitoring them and by challenging attempts to infringe them. But in modern society no individual will get very far in challenging authority on her own -collective action and community support are always required to define, defend, and promote our democratic rights. "Take it on trust and you will be taken and trussed".
Moreover, there are evident tensions and indeed conflicts between the various potential contenders as "trumps" in the rights game (the right to information versus the right to privacy; the right to protection from crime versus the presumption of innocence, and so on). Some rights are legally enforceable entitlements; some are universally grounded moral convictions; some are passionately advocated and equally passionately resisted; and some are aspirations rather than solidly established expectations. Finally, in unequal societies, the objective and subjective distribution of rights (whether as entitlements or as aspirations) is uneven between classes, races, regions, age cohorts, and genders.
According to a standard liberal view of rights every rights claim must be attached to individual claimants, and each claim by one individual generates a counterpart duty to meet that claim that falls on other individuals. But such precision and individuation is an ideal construct quite far removed from the everyday life experience of most citizens, even in the best established of democracies. 
Rights and Justice Systems
For example, there is an emerging body of comparative work on the observable performance of courts and justice systems, as they interact with their particular stratum of subjects and citizens in these new democracies
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. One such study, finds somewhat surprisingly, "that social rights have been enforced most readily in new or fragile democracies, where the judicial branch has typically not had the time to build the legitimacy required to survive political conflict, and where the resources needed to implement social rights are typically fewer than elsewhere" (GARGARELLA, DOMINGO and ROUX, 2006, p. 256). It turns out that where the resources for social protection are the most inadequate, and where the authority of the courts is most precarious, these may be the most favourable conditions for using the judiciary to keep alive the hope that eventually minimum social entitlements may prove generalisable; and that legal entrepreneurs may mobilise this potential as a means to strengthen their otherwise precarious institutional base. These case studies point to "the emancipatory potential of the law and the appropriation of language of rights [when] courtrooms become an arena for political battles framed in the language of rights and constitutional entitlements" (GARGARELLA, DOMINGO and ROUX, 2006, p. 269) . They suggest "a sort of 'discovery' of the law and legal channels from below by citizens that are more aware and demanding of their rights, and with changing expectations of what can be achieved through strategies of legal mobilization" (GARGARELLA, DOMINGO and ROUX, 2006, p. 269) 2 . At the same time, they acknowledge at least two crucial limitations to relying on justiciable social rights as a means to strengthen the social foundations of fragile new democratic regimes. They acknowledge the "selection bias" in their choice of case studies (Brazil, Hungary, and India, many be unrepresentatively favourable examples, although Angola, Bolivia and Colombia are also included, and exemplify various types of limitation).
More critically, they stress that courts alone are unlikely to produce a great deal of social change -only if their effects are reinforced by other institutions, such as the executive, the legislative, the political parties, and local administrations are these aspirational shifts likely to be transformed into reliable expectations I would add the further caveat that the successful judicialization of social rights could normally be expected to induce its own antidote. Over time, if the courts prove more authoritative than expected and more capable of allocating scares resources, it would be reasonable to anticipate that more privileged sectors of society would begin to pursue their own interests through legal channels, in competition with the poor. In general, it would be prudent to expect that the better off will normally be best placed to turn such machinery to their advantage, and that legal entrepreneurs have more to gain from servicing the elites than from catering to the dispossessed. At a minimum one might foresee contentious politics and instability of rights as a medium term outcome of the judicialization of social entitlements, particularly where the poor can be divided by language, religion, caste, region, and so on. However that may be, we have here a highly researchable topic for comparative investigation within the broader field of "democratic citizenship" studies.
Rights and Citizen Security
Citizen security provides another quite specific and empirically researchable area of comparative study within this overall context. It is, in principle, a fundamental responsibility of any democratic state to provide at least a minimum level of personal and collective security to the whole of its citizenry. Many would argue that the state itself rests on an underlying social compact, whereby subjects relinquish some of their freedom of action (accept the responsibilities of citizenship) in exchange for credible assurances of state protection. Should the state fail (or abdicate from) its role as provider of security then its subjects, following the inescapable logic of self-preservation would be released from these restraints and entitled to save themselves by other means. According to this reasoning the democratic state extends additional guarantees to its subjects (they become citizens, with civil and political rights as well as an entitlement to state protection) and secures additional levels of cooperation in return. Citizens owe cooperation rather than just acquiescence; they gain protection from abusive treatment (dignity) as well as the right to survival. Foucault presents this as an internalization of restrains that were hitherto outwardly imposed, so that the art of government becomes that of both guaranteeing the liberty of the citizenry and also of manufacturing it at each moment. So for him the democratic authorities must continually produce, maintain, and also limit the freedoms exercised by their citizens, and must allocate the costs arising from this public activity In many new democracies there are highly differentiated systems of collective security, they are unstable, and they overlap. Thus, from a "bottom up" perspective to judge what guarantees one can rely upon requires much finer discriminations than simply "the state" versus "the mafia". The precise location, the time of day, the informal conventions of the locality, may be far more critical then any abstract system of reassurance or guarantees, either from state agencies or from poderes fácticos. Some elite sectors of the population may live in gated communities, protected by private security forces, and mostly sheltered from the uncertainties affecting the citizenry in general. At the other end of the scale, the most vulnerable may have no realistic prospect of obtaining any kind of public protection under any circumstances. But most -unusually a large majority of the democratic electorate -are likely to be strung out between these two extremes. They can neither rely upon their social compact with the democratic state, nor disregard it. It has to be factored in as an aspirational claim, a potential entitlement, and an occasional resource. But it cannot command exclusive allegiance from most citizens, because it does not reliably protect them from most threats to their physical security. More precisely, many citizens in these new democracies do not perceive the official security and justice systems as trustworthy first lines of defence against basic insecurities.
There are various -perhaps cross-cutting -responses possible here, including demanding police reform or mano dura, protesting against state failure in this area, turning to alternative sources of protection, or (quite commonly) relying on personal survival strategies that weaken collective solidarity. For their part, the democratic authorities have to cope with this public distrust and these legacies of state failure. They may sometimes devise incremental strategies for regaining lost ground and building conventional democratic authority.
But they may also fall back on short-term expedients that only reinforce long-term perceptions of their unreliability. Or they may practice large scale denial -deploying an official discourse that pretends they are fully in control, while only in practice acting to protect their most limited core institutions and constituencies. Just as the most typical response of the median citizen may be salvese quien pueda survival strategies that weaken collective solidarity, so at the state level the line of least resistance may well be to remain reactive and thus allow the prevalent insecurity to persist. The result is likely to be an unstable equilibrium, or as O'Donnell (1993) has written elsewhere, "a low intensity" citizenship.
Comparative research on citizen insecurity in new democracies is now underway. It tends to disaggregate this overall picture into a series of more discrete and manageable sub-themes -victimization rates; 
Gender and Rights
A well-developed feminist critique of the conventional discourse of rights points out the contrast between the (usually male dominated) public sphere in which such entitlements can more easily be claimed and In general, however, the citizenry of most new democracies has to make its leadership and policy choices, and to interpret its ongoing political realities, on the basis of public information that falls drastically short of what would be required by most theories of transparency and accountability. The "right to information" enjoyed by most voters in new democracies is even more constrained, distorted, and subject to reversal than is the case in long-established democratic regimes. Here too, a "quality of democracy" analysis that seriously ranks and compares the communications performance of governments, media, think tanks, and the like in different new democracies would be likely to uncover large inter-country and inter-temporal variations, together with great differences between regions and social strata. As with the other spheres of citizenship reviewed in this brief article, instability and unreliability are often key watchwords. Where this becomes apparent, it may sow popular distrust and citizen disillusion, although it can also serve as a spur to corrective reforms
Conclusions
In the space available it has only been possible to comment on a partial selection of the many rights claimed by citizens in contemporary REVISTA DEBATES, Porto Alegre, v. 2, n.1, p. 33-50, jan.-jun.2008.
democracies. The complete ensemble would also need to include more social rights; environmental protections (including the rights and duties associated with inter-generational transfers); the rights of refugees and internally displaced persons; the rights of the aged; and perhaps some collective rights claimed by ethnic and religious minorities and other discriminated-against groups. The language of rights can be applied in all these areas and wherever it is adopted the implication of this discourse will be that such rights need to be universally applied and need to be given precedence over more partial and self-serving claims.
This paper is not an attack on the moral or philosophical basis of such claims nor is it intended to belittle the beneficial consequences that can follow from their adoption. It is, however, a reminder of the sociological reality that in highly fragmented and unequal societies the rhetoric of universality is unlikely to translate easily into genuine evenness of application. Also, in new democracies emerging from authoritarian regimes, the sudden emerging explosion of rights claims and the abrupt multiplication of rights claimants can easily generate an atmosphere of rights inflation that may stimulate activism and social anxiety, and this is liable to raise expectations well beyond what is reliably deliverable.
For all these reasons, social mapping of the range and distribution of bankable rights is likely to uncover a reality that falls well short of the rhetoric of universalism. Especially in new democracies this empirical variability may be accompanied (for most citizens) by a considerable degree of instability over time ("volatility") . The combination of variability and volatility in societies where the "duties" corresponding to rights are not securely internalised, is liable to produce patterns of political behaviour that deviate substantially from the interlocking mutuality of interest postulated by classical liberalism. "Contentious" political cycles of resistance and exclusion, and struggles to reshape the rules of the game (rather than merely to live within them) seem to be 
